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This is a transcription of the messages within released logs of the FBI investigation, which can be found here. It offers a viewpoint into Ago and the 2003 Leak not often seen.


May 5, 2004 - "Fax Transmission"

The first message in the document. The second page is noticeably different from the first visually.

Dear Frank and Joern,

Attached is a short summary of the content of recent chat logs between GEMBE and a confidential informant, from Agent Mike Gordon (he did a short summary, because the logs are many pages). He can fax these to the Legat office, or email them to me on our internal email system. Let me know how urgently you need these.

Seattle advised that they can send the emails between Valve and GEMBE, but it is about 40 pages. They are sending this to the Legat Frankfurt office via our internal email system. If you want this immediately, I can fax it to you.

04/12/2004 - Microsoft Release patch concerning the LSASS Vulnerability - CAN-2003-0533

04/14/2004 - Comments made indicate that "PhaTTy" and "evilbyte: are working on LSASS exploits

04/16/2004 - Wonk/Ago indicates that he is developing an LSASS exploit and almost identified the appropriate function call

04/17/2004 - Wonk/Ago indicates that he is still working on the LSASS exploit

04/18/2004 - Wonk/Ago identified the buffer and has to craft RPC packets with longer strings, at which point it will be provided to the group "xfocus" in exchange for additional 0-day exploits, doesn't currently plan to make a scanner or place in bots due to fear of bounty being placed by Microsoft. Wonk/Ago indicated that he would use the LSASS exploit on some "high profile" sites and that "some critical infrastructure" does not patch because of difficulties. Wonk/Ago prefers to be "stealthy" and gather information. Successfully exploited the vulnerability on Windows 2000 and Windows XP Home OS.

04/19/2004 - Wonk/Ago and unknown chinese subject "ey4s", from XFocus group, cooperating to make LSASS exploit work on all versions of Windows OS. Wonk/Ago acknowledges that the vulnerability was fixed in the last patch, but that most people have not applied the patches yet. Working exploit for all versions of Windows finished.

04/26/2004 - LSASS exploit added to source code for AgoBot. Members of AgoBot development team start to use LSASS enabled bots to compromise computers.

05/01/2004 - Wonk/Ago creates code that enables PhatBot/AgoBot to take advantage of Sasser Worm spread by compromising the Sasser Worm and causing PhatBot to be installed on the compromised computer when the command shell is opened on port 9996.


May 4, 2004 - "Another intrusion into Valve by GEMBE"

The second email in the document. It notes that valve is "not comfortable" with the security of their network post-leak.

Hello everyone, Enclosed is an EC I prepared detailing the latest actions and communications between Gembe and Valve. Kristen/Stacy, please provide me with fax numbers, and I can fax the referenced e-mails to get them to you ASAP. Valve is not comfortable with the security of their network (especially after the subsequent intrusion by Gembe), so they usually just provide me with hard copies. Thanks!


May 4, 2004 - "Re: 288A-SE-89085, 05/04/2004"

A moderately-long summary of Axel Gembe's desire for a job at Valve and overzealous, hacking-based means of doing so. The strange cutoff at the beginning implies there is a missing first page.

Transfer Protocal (FTP) link for the exploit's base code as well as a portion of the code.

On May 02, 2004, GEMBE contacted Reynolds once again via email. In the e-mail, GEMBE stated that he is "currently auditing" Valve's network. Specifically, GEMBE stated "i think i sent you the lsass exploit early, so i comprehended not patching an invitation :)." Basically, GEMBE used the lsass exploit to once again hack into Valve's network without their permission. GEMBE further requested to be allowed to remain in the Valve systems and stated "ill let noone log the passwords this time :)," referring to his previous compromises of the Valve Software network. Valve informed Seattle Division, they never consented to allow GEMBE into their network and informed him that he should never do this without talking to them or without their permission. In the past, Valve has told GEMBE he did not have permission to initiate any type of penetration testing of their network.

During the time GEMBE had access to the network, Valve experienced a degredation in network performance and some of the services they were running. At this point, Valve was unable to say whether or not GEMBE's actions resulted in the degredation.

Reynolds informed Seattle Division he was very concerned by GEMBE's aggressive nature and for the safety of the Valve network. Reynolds was aware of the Trojans and a self-compiled version of the SSX client, Putty, installed by GEMBE during the intrusion. The modified version of Putty was logging information from Valve and sending it outside of their network. Valve Software stated they were taking steps to secure the holes found and exploited by GEMBE.

GEMBE is still pursuing his interest of working for Valve and stated he only hacked Valve's network because he was "bored" and waiting for them to respond concerning a job opportunity. GEMBE has been very persistent in his pursuit of employment at Valve.

Although he is twenty-one years of age, GEMBE has repeatedly shown an aggressive nature in dealing with Valve and has demonstrated a high-degree of technical knowledge and skill. GEMBE has also been manipulative and coercive with Valve concerning his role in multiple intrusions into their network and has displayed a determination to continue his behavior. GEMBE appears to be a major player in the authoring of the lsass exploit and well as one of the leaders of the "AGOBOT" development group, responsible for the development and distribution of various bots and the launching of multiple Distributed Denial of Service attacks. GEMBE has also shown an enterprising nature by receiving payments for the writing of exploits. As a result, Seattle believes this clearly demonstrates GEMBE should be held accountable for his behavior and considered an adult by German authorities.

Seattle Division will continue to support the German investigation, arrest, and prosecution of GEMBE to the fullest extent and in a manner most timely.


May 3, 2004 - "Subject Information"

MGordon notes that a few more IPs have joined the list of those that have entered the monitored chat server. An attachment is included, which presumably is a whois on said monitored chat server.

Ladies, Gentlemen,

I hope that May finds everyone doing well. Since the last e-mail, 2 new individuals have been in the chat channel, with IP addresses resolving to Germany. The summary below details breifly the believed identity of each individual based on appearances in the chat room and a comparison of nicknames and IP Addresses, under the belief that wonk/stebo are brothers, living together, and using the same Internet connection. The IP Address for Gumble may have been included in a previous update. The subject NewRoot has only recently entered the channel in the last 2 or 3 days.

Attachments

March 22, 2004 - "Fax transmission"

A highly detailed report on Axel Gembe in general, and his efforts to be hired by Valve.

Dear Herr Eismann,

As I stated in the previous fax, I am now providing you details, some of which you may already have, regarding the FBI investigation into the theft of intellectual property and computer intrusion and suspect AXEL GEMBE.

Agobot Virus and Distributed Denial of Service Attacks of Websites and Internet Service Providers

Investigation by multiple United States law enforcement agencies has established since October 2002, GEMBE has been participating in the development and deployment of a malicious computer code known as Agobot/gaobot Virus. The virus works by automatically gaining unauthorized access to Internet computers, in order to use those computers to launch hundreds of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on victim computer networks. The targets of these attacks include well-known commercial websites such as eBay. Sales revenue and business losses, although difficult to estimate, can readily multiply into the millions of dollars. For example, Internet Service providers Tiscali UK and Aeneas Internet and Telephone, Memphis, Tennessee, USA, were each shut down by the virus for approximately four days, resulting in estimated losses of $1.6 million (USD) and $50,000 (USD), respectively.

The Investigation of DDoS Attacks

Beginning in October 2002, and continuing until February 2004, numerous Internet Service Providers (ISPs), individual computers, and business computer networks were the victims of DDoS attacks launched from other computers infected with the Agobot/gaobot virus. The virus spreads by scanning the Internet for computers vulnerable to attack. If it locates such a computer, it installs itself, leaving behind a "back door" which causes the computer to report to a communication channel controlled by the person who spawned the virus. An infected or compromised computer is called a "bot". By instructing the mass of infected bots to flood a particular computer on the internet, an individual can overwhelm the computer, effectively denying service to it.

The Unite States Service opened an investigation in January 2003, when a local ISP, Aeneas Internet and Telephone, was hit with periodic DDoD attacks over a two-month period of time. The attack peaked when Aeneas was forced off-line for approximately four days, resulting in an estimated $50,000 loss.

The investigation established that the Agobot/gaobot virus was authored, maintained, modified, and made more virulent by an individual known by the screen nickname "Ago,", who actually inserted his photograph and email address in one version of the virus.

The Agobot/gaobot virus was responsible for a DDoS attack of Tiscali UK, a large ISP. Tiscali was denied service for approximately four days, resulting in an estimated $1.6 million loss. On February 11, 2004, LEE WALKER was arrested in the United Kingdom. WALKER admitted that he and Ago had launched numerous DDoS attacks, and that Ago had authored the virus, and continued to modify and improve it. He claimed he knew Ago lived in Germany and that his first name was "Alex" or "Axel,", but could not identify him further.

Hundreds of Internet sites were victimized in the DDoS attacks launched by GEMBE and/or WALKER, using the virus authored and maintained by GEMBE. In addition, the virus was often used to attack a target by attacking Domain Name System (DNS) servers, computers which serve as part of the infrastructure of the Internet. By attacking DNS servers, the virus affected service to other Internet sites besides the specific, intended target.

According to recent information obtained by the FBI, Ago and the other authors of the Agobot/gaobot control a bot network of anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 computers. This network is capable of traffic generating speeds of 30-35 gigabits per second. It is believed that the country of New Zealand may have been "knocked offline" (internet service was disabled) by an attack launched by the group.

Investigation has determined that Ago is selling the malicious code on the Internet. Ago utilizes the Paypal account "theago@gmx.net" to sell his malicious code.Authors of malicious code often spread worms and viruses simply for the challenge and ability to claim within their on-line community the "bragging rights" for disabling or disrupting a major ISP or business. In addition to spreading the code to anyone with the resources to purchase it, Ago is now personally profiting by the release of the code. Ago has every motivation to distribute the code to the maximum extent possible, and no motivation to stop. This makes his arrest and prosecution more urgent.

The following excerpt, quoted from the Agobot/gaobot source code, illustrates Ago's ability to enlist assistance with the creation and distribution of the malicious code:

Contributions to Agobot3:

Num - Name - What

1. - Ago - Writing Agobot3 base, being the author/administrator
2. - Fight - Hosting my testing bots
3. - killer77 - Donating money to make Agobot3 as good as it is today
4. - dj-fu - Helped me finding bugs
5. - Chrono - Hosting me a site and helping find bugs
6. - harr0 - Hosting me a site
7. - ryan1918 - Hosting me a site or forum too (not yet)
8. - PhaTTy - Implementing new features into Agobot3
9. - weed - Making me high while programming

thx to anyone on this list and everyone i forgot for making Agobot3 what it is.

Furthermore, another "trojan" (hidden) bot has been developed and unleashed on the Internet. This bot goes by the name Phatbot. It has been determined by FBI examination to the malicious code found within Phatbot builds upon the code sued in the Agobot/gaobot. This new bot is considered to be very dangerous because it has the ability to be polymorphic on installation in an attempt to evade anti-virus signatures as it spreads from computer to computer.

Valve Software Computer Network Intrusion and Theft of Intellectual Property

GEMBE has been identified as the hacker who in 2003 gained unauthorizes access into the network of game developer Valve Software, which resulted in the theft and public dissemination of a pre-release version of Valve Software's flagship computer game, Half Life II (HL2). Based on profits from its initial version of the game, Valve Software anticipated (and has now lost) $250,000,000.00 in sales revenue from HL2.

Since the middle of February 2004, GEMBE has been communicating with Valve Software management via email, attempting to convince Valve Software that although he was the intruder, he was not responsible for the dissemination of their software. He has also aggressively sought employment with Valve Software, citing his imminent mandatory conscription as a reason for wanting to leave the EU and obtain work in the States.

GEMBE's email discussions with Valve Software have progressed to the point where some law enforcement intervention is critical. Specifically, GEMBE has expressed impatience with the slow response from Valve Software, and has remarked that he has the ability to gain control over Valve Software's network computers should he decide to do so. GEMBE is expecting a job interview with Valve Software by telephone, followed shortly thereafter by an expense-paid trip to the States. United States authorities involved with this case are concerned that if GEMBE discovers that Valve Software's employment interest is not sincere, he may retaliate. Valve Software acknowledges that GEMBE may currently have access to a computer on its network, but believes that he cannot penetrate further into its system. Still, GEMBE's skill in DDoS attacks has heightened concerns.

The Investigation of Valve Software Intrusion

Valve Software, located in Bellevue, Washington, USA, creates, produces and sells popular Internet-based computer video games. One of these games is Half-Life, an immensely popular game with sales exceeding $250,000,000. Valve Software was in the process of developing Half Life II (HL2), the widely-anticipated sequel to Half-Life, when their computer network was victimized by an unlawful intrusion.

Valve Software learned of the criminal intrusion into its computer system on October 1, 2003, when the company became aware that an internal email from one Valve Software employee to another had been posted on a public website, and later, that programming code for HL2 and other Valve Software games had been stolen and released on different websites. Valve Software employee computer passwords were also posted. Since then, a working, unreleased version of HL2 and another Valve Software game have been circulated on the Internet. HL2 is now reportedly being sold on computer disks in Russia. As a result of all this activity, Valve Software began an in-depth review of the computers on their network and found at least thirteen machines that had been compromised within their network. Valve believes the intrusion may have occurred as early as June 2003. The computers were provided to the FBI for further forensic analysis.

Forensic analysts discovered a variety of "hacker" programs installed without Valve Software's permission. Another program created a secure but unauthorized method of remote access, a "tunnel" for a hacker to use to sneak back into Valve Software's system. On one of Valve Software's networked computers, this program was configured to connect to a website in Germany. To identify the person who controlled the website, the German ISP who owns the address for the website would have to provide subscriber information. There were also instances of the Agobot/gaobot found on Valve Software victim machines.

On February 16, 2004, U.S. authorities were contacted by Valve Software after the Chief Executive Owner (CEO) received an email from an individual claiming to have been the person who hacked into the Valve Software network. The individual used the name "DaGuy" and the following email address: daguy@hush.com. That email address was provided by Hush Communications, a company located in Vancouver, Canada, which provides anonymous re-mailing services.

DaGuy claimed to have had access to the Valve Software network for approximately six months. He provided Valve Software with technical information "proving" he truly was the hacker. To date, these claims and details have been validated by the forensic analysis performed by both Valve Software and the FBI, and are also consistent with the details described in the chat logs previously provided to Valve Software.

DaGuy appears to be strongly motivated to convince Valve Software that he is not an "evil" hacker. He claimed that he had hacked into Valve Software's system only to observe their development of HL2. He claimed that he was careless during an IRC session with a friend, and that members of a group known as myg0t eavesdropped on this conversation and obtained sufficient information to enable them to use his established but unauthorized access into Valve Software's network. In fact, myg0t was responsible for the initial public dissemination of the internal Valve Software email and source code.

DaGuy has attempted to prove he could be helpful to Valve Software by providing advice regarding its network security and on February 19, 2004, DaGuy asked Valve Software's CEO if they had any job openings. On February 27, 2004, the CEO asked DaGuy if his interest was serious, and DaGuy replied that he was. On February 28, 2004, DaGuy expressed some urgency in coming to the U.S., as he was concerned about conscription. He said he needed to know as soon as possible. On March 3, 2004, the CEO apologized for not responding more quickly and promised to be more prompt. He requested a resume. He advised DaGuy that Valve Software would fly both he and his wife to the United States for a job interview. DaGuy replied that he was not married and would need funds to travel.

After days of sending emails without response, on March 6, 2004, DaGuy sarcastically asked the CEO what he meant by "prompt", and claimed he could have taken control of one of Valve Software's network computers if his intentions weren't benevolent. He wondered whether he should break into Valve Software's computer to fix it.

On March 8, 2004, the CEO advised DaGuy that Valve Software will pay for travel and relocation expenses.

On March 10, 2004, DaGuy provided a phone number (xx xxxx xxxxx) for an initial telephone intervview, pursuant to Valve Software's standard hiring procedures. Valve Software is prepared to conduct the telephone interview.

As of March 20, 2004, there was a website, www.cs-ipv6/6bone/whois/nic-hdl/ago1-6bone, which contains an FTP archive "who is" list. This list contained the following details for AGO1-6BONE:

person: Axel Gembe
address: Schonenbergerstrasse 8
address: 79688 Schonau
phone: 49 7673 9322218
email: theago@gmx.net
mic-hdl: AGO1-6BONE
url: http://www.bastart.eu.org/
notify: theago@gmx.net
mnt-by: AGOMNT-6BONE
change:theago@gmx.net 20040128
source:6BONE

The phone number included in the above reference is the same as the one provided by DaGuy, with the exception of the last digits, to Valve Software on March 10, 2004.

Please advise me of any investigative actions. Do not hesitate to contact me if you have any additional questions.


March 22, 2004 - "Fax Transmission"

A request from the FBI side of the investigation, essentially asking what the German side will be doing.

Dear Herr Eismann,

I am providing you information regarding an FBI investigation into the theft of intellectual property and computer intrusion. Investigation indicates that the subject responsible is AXEL GEMBE, residing in Germany.

Recent developments have added urgency to this matter, as GEMBE is now communicating via email directly with a CEO of Valve Software, and is threatening to do further damage by taking control of Valve Software computers.

The information provided below is a summary of the most recent investigative development. I will send a follow-up fax with additional, detailed information regarding the entire investigation.

Immediate intervention into the criminal activities of AXEL GEMBE, of Schonan, Germany, is considered extremely urgent. GEMBE, (also known as "Ago"), as now considered by U.S. authorities to be a primary suspect in two separate, international cyber crimes of major proportions.

GEMBE has been identified as the hacker who in 2003 gained unauthorized access into

the network of game developer Valve Software, which resulted in the theft and public dissemination of a pre-release version of Valve Software's flagship computer game, Half Life II (HL2). Based on profits from its initial version of the game, Valve Software estimated $250,000,000.00 in lost sales revenue from HL2.

Since the middle of February 2004, GEMBE has been communicating with Valve Software management via email, attempting to convince Valve that although he was the intruder, he was not responsible for the dissemination of their software. He has also aggressively sought employment with Valve Software, citing his imminent mandatory military service as a reason for wanting to leave the EU and obtain work in the States.

Valve Software is cooperating with the FBI in this matter. GEMBE's email discussions with Valve Software have progressed to the point where some law enforcement intervention is critical. Specifically, GEMBE has expressed impatience with the slow response from Valve Software, and has remarked that he has the ability to gain control over Valve Software's network computers should he decide to do so.

GEMBE is expecting a job interview with Valve Software by telephone, followed shortly thereafter by an expense-paid trip to the States. On March 10, 2004, GEMBE provided a phone number (xx xxxx xxxxx) for an initial telephone interview, pursuant to Valve Software's standard hiring procedures.

The FBI is concerned that if GEMBE discovers that Valve Software's employment interest is not sincere, or if they continue to stall, he may retailiate.

Please advise me as to your anticipated investigative actions. Do not hesitate to contact me if you have any additional questions.


March 16, 2004 - "Re: myg0t.com AGO"

An e-mail that provides background on Axel and requesting from the German government information helping to lead to his arrest.

Dear Herr Kreitlow,

The following information is in reference to a computer intrusion. The victim company is Valve Software. One of the main subjects involved is believed to be located in Germany, using the nick of AGO.

On October 2, 2003, Valve Software, reported to the FBI the theft of their source code for the new engine technology in Half-Life 2 (HL2). HL2 is a popular game within the Internet community. The release date for HL2 was set for the end of September 2003. However, it was pushed back to an undisclosed time.

To date, at least 13 Valve internal machines were compromised. Valve found machines that had both key loggers and backdoor trojans installed on them. The Valve email system was also compromised as an email sent from one internal employee to another was intercepted and published on the www.myg0t.com website. www.myg0t.com is a site dedicated to gaming cheats and producing mods for online games.

Through forensic analysis of the victim systems, numerous leads and potential subjects have been identified around the world with one of the main subjects being located in Germany and using the moniker "AGO". Two of the Valve victim machines contained detailed technical information that led back to AGO and a number of Germany Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Through further investigation, it has also been determined that AGO's real name is "AXEL GEMBE" who is quite possibly residing in Schoenau, Germany.

On 16 February 2004, Valve software provided the FBI with an e-mail sent to the CEO of Valve, claiming to be from the hacker regarding information about the computer intrusion into the Valve Software network and the theft of the HL2 source code.

The e-mail address used by the sender was daguy@hush.com. The sender claimed to have had access to the Valve network for approximately six months. However, he/she denied distributing the HL2 source code over the Internet. The sender then provided Valve with technical information "proving" he/she was legitimate. The sender then referenced the myg0t group and claimed the access he/she had obtained into the Valve network was discovered my myg0t members.

The sender stated his/her motivation for hacking into the Valve network was only to "observe the HL2 development process." To date, the sender continues to send e-mails to Valve from the daguy@hush.com address. A lookup resulting in the e-mail address coming back to a Vancouver-based company, Hush Communications, 455 Granville Street, Suite 203, Vancouver, BC V6C 1T1, Canada. This company does not retain any log-on or identifying information.

Based on details in the e-mails, it is believed that the anonymous sender of these messages could be AXEL GEMBE a.k.a AGO.

As you are aware United States Secret Service (Case Agent Kevin Sandlin) also has an open and active case against GEMBE for various Denial of Service (DOS) attacks and the authoring of malicious code, namely the AGOBOT which is an IRC-controlled backdoor with network spreading capabilities. There are variants of this initial worm as well that he may be responsible for writing and distributing.

The FBI is hopeful that German officials will be interested in opening an investigation on AGO. The FBI would like to be provided with any subscriber information for accounts/sites/e-mails associated with AGO and, ultimately, would hope that a German investigation could result in a search warrant for his computer systems. AGO is also linked with the large botnet investigation into Creative Internet Technologies, a.k.a. FOONET

As a side note, there is a belief that GEMBE may be the son of a German Magistrate Judge. This has not been confirmed.


May 4, 2004 - "Re: Intrusion into Valve Software Netwoork"

A detailed report of Axel's previous actions, who he is, accompanied with a request to the German authorities for information about him.

Summary of Investigation

Valve Software, located in Bellevue, Washington, USA, creates, produces and sells popular Internet-based computer video games. One of these games is Half-Life, an immensely popular game with sales exceeding $250,000,000 (US$). Valve Software was in the process of developing Half-Life II (HL2), the widely-anticipated sequel to Half-Life, when their computer was "hacked" into or accessed without authorization. Based upon the sales of the original game, Valve Software had expected HL2 to generate sales revenue of at least $200,000,000.

Valve Software learned of the unauthorized intrusion into its computer system on October 1, 2003, when the company became aware that an internal email from one Valve Software employee to another had been posted on a public website, and later, that programming code for HL2 and other Valve games had been stolen and released on different websites. Valve employee computer passwords were also posted. Since then, a working, unreleased version of HL2 and another Valve game have been circulated on the Internet. HL2 is now reportedly being sold on computer disks in Russia. As a result of all this activity, Valve Software began an in-depth review of the computers on their network and found at least thirteen machines that had been compromised within their network. Valve believes that the intrusion may have occurred as early as June 2003. The computers were provided to the FBI for further forensic analysis.

Forensic analysts discovered a variety of "hacker" programs installed without Valve Software's permission. One allowed an intruder to capture passwords and other confidential information. Another program created a secure but unauthorized method of remote access, a "tunnel" for a hacker to use to sneak back into Valve's system. On one of Valve's networked computers, this program was configured to connect to the website "ago.gotdns.org."

Like any other computer on the internet, the computer which contains the website "ago.gotdns.org" must have a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address so that Internet traffic sent from and directed to that computer is directed properly from its source to its destination. The IP address can be permanently assigned or dynamically assigned, meaning the computer is assigned a different IP address each time a new connection to the Internet is made. Either way, the IP Address used by a computer attached to the internet must be unique for the duration of the session, that is, from connection to disconnection. ISPs typically log their customers' connection, which means the ISP can, for a period of time, identify which of their customers were assigned a specific IP address during the time period of this session.

In this case, the IP address of the website "ago.gotdns.org" was dynamically assigned. Although the IP addresses of this website during the 2003 intrusion into Valve's computer network are not known, the website remained active into 2004. It was checked regularly by investigators beginning in November of 2003, the last time on February 6, 2004. The IP addresses assigned to "ago.gotdns.org" during these checks are listed below in paragraph 3 of the request.

The investigation has associated another website with "Ago." A posted message dated April 4, 2000, was found on a website identifying himself as Axel Gembe, with the email address theago@gmx.net, with the webpage "ago.daemon.sh." There is an important connection between the "ago.daemon.sh" website and the "ago.gotdns.ors" website. Both have dynamically assigned IP aggresses. When checked on the date and times listed in paragraph 1, the two webpages had the same IP address, which suggests both are on the same computer, the computer of the person who has the secure but unauthorized tunnel into a computer on Valve Software's computer network.

After Valve Software discovered the intrusion on October, 2003, it asked the community of Half Life gamer and others to come forward with any information about those responsible. Two individuals, one anonymous, provided logs or transcripts of online communications known as "chat." In both, an individual claimed responsibility for the Valve Software intrusion and provided details consistent with the FBI's forensic analysis. In one of the chats, the individual identified himself as "ef~Ago." In the second chat log, dated October 11, 2003, the anonymous tipster identified the confessing hacker's IP Address as frb9_d9bb4a51.pool.Mediaways.net, which resolved to the numeric IP address 217.187.73.89 as of October 25, 2003.

On February 16, 2004, U.S. authorities were contacted by Valve Software after the Chief Executive Owner (CEO) received an email from an individual claiming to have been the person who hacked into the Valve Software network. The individual used the following email address: daguy@hush.com. That email address was provided by Hush Communications, a company located in Vancouver, Canada, which provides anonymous remailing services.

The sender claimed to have had access to the Valve Software network for approximately six months. The sender then provided Valve Software with technical information "proving" he/she truly was the hacker. To date, these claims and details have been validated by the forensic analysis performed by both Valve Software and the FBI, and are also consistent with the details described in the chat logs previously provided to Valve Software. The sender continued to communicate with Valve's CEO, and is actively seeking work with or for Valve in connection with the security of its network.

Requested Information:

Please include the following information for each of the below requests if possible:

  • Customer name (including all possible customers)
  • Billing address and residential address
  • Telephone number
  • Any assigned network Internet Protocol address
  • Records of session times and durations (beginning in June 2003)
  • Length of service (including a start date)
  • Type of services utilized (that is, DSL, cable modem, dial-up, web-hosting, e-mail, etc)
  • Means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account information)
  • Whether or not the IP Address is assigned dynamically or statically
  • Any other information concerning the identity of the creator/subscriber, including but not limited to, other e-mail addressed, account profiles, date of birth, gender, or occupation
  • Complete and accurate date and time stamps
  1. Please provide any available subscriber information, detailed above, for the users, assigned the IP address 217.187.73.89 and/or hostname frb9-d9bb4a51.pool.Mediaways.net, on October 11, 2003.
  2. Please provide any available subscriber information, detailed above, for the users assigned the e-mail address theago@gmx.net
  3. Please provided any available subscriber information, detailed above, for the users assigne the following IP addresses and hostnames at associated times (Times are all Eastern Standard Time (EST); UTC/GMT - 5hours):

Where the information cannot be provided, please preserve it until appropriate legal process can be obtained.

Your consideration of this request is greatly appreciated.


September 25, 2003 - "Unnamed Chatlogs"

Two chatlogs, containing all of "Ago's utterances on a private bot code creation server".


March 25, 2004 - "Da guy interview"

A write-out of Axel's over-the-phone interview with Valve. It reveals a few interesting details, such as Valve's version control and some directory names.

We had a phone interview commencing at 11:03am PST on 03/26/2004 with someone claiming to be the person that hacked valve (daguy).

He contacted me on my phone extension in my office (extension 100). His initial contact was via na IDSN connection into his PC. He had trouble with the connection (bad voice quality) so we terminated that call and he rang us back via another line. He said this line was his phone line. The second call commenced at 11:13 am PST.

I spoke with him briefly when I answered the second call and introduced Greg Coome. At this time Greg Coomer, Matt Bamberger, Yahn Bernier and myself were in the room. Greg introduced himself and said that it was unusual to not know his name. Daguy then stated his name was "Axel Gembe" and that he was from Germany.

Greg then explained how the interview would proceed and then passed him off to Matt Bamberger. Matt asked Axel a series of technical questions related to programming. He asked him what projects he has worked on before, how large those projects where and what problems they had and how he solved them. They also discussed source control and some issues about it. Axel also mentioned creating a remote administration program and discussed some issues with writing it and maintaining it.

Once Matt had finished his questioning I was introduced to him. I quickly introduced myself and asked him if he would like to talk about some generic technical questions I had prepared or whether he wanted to go straight to talking about how he hacked us. He was eager to talk about the hacking event. My first question was simply how he did it. He then went on to describe how he infiltrated our network and the various programs and exploits he used. The details are as follows.

He entered the network via the tangis.com machine. He claims to have used an account with an empty password to get on the machine initially. Once on the machine he exploited the web server with a remote CGI exploit to escalate his account privileges.

One he had control of tangis.com he made use of the trust relationship on the firewall to scan our internal LAN network. He found a machine (a "distributed compiler" machine to use his words) that he claims had another blank password. He used that account to enter the machine. Once on this machine he used a cracking tool to attack the password database on the Primary Domain Controlled (PDC) and extract user accounts and passwords.

Once he had harvested some passwords he used these to get on various workstation machines, he mentioned my workstation in particular. He also used VSS to gain access to our HL2 content and perforce to get our source code. He said that he got onto "jeeves" (the name of the perforce server) and the ip addresses 207.173.178.176, 207.173.178.173 and 207.173.178.12 (.12 is the ip address assigned to "jeeves"). Perforce is a source control system we use.

I then asked him about any linux boxes he may have compromised. He described how he used a SSH buffer overflow exploit on one of the machines to gain access. He also claimed that one of the accounts on the machine had the same password as an account on the PDS (and that he used that).

He then said he installed the "adore" rootkit onto the machine to mask his presence and used the "vrun" application to create a tunnel between his PC and our server. He said that he created the "hl2roxx" directory on one of our machines. I mentioned I found a ".bla" directory and he said that he had also created that directory.

He also said he used a custom application to sync to our VSS tree across this vtun tunnel. Initially he used this application on a windows machine (he did not mention which one specifically) but he said that was too slow so he then ported the application to run on our linux machines.

Next I asked him how HL2 had been leaked. He claimed that he had been discussing his break in of valve on IRC with a friend and he suspected the owner of the IRC server to be monitoring his chat.

I asked him if he was still on our network (or had been in our network post October 1st 2003) and he said that he had compromised our FTP server since then but had been unable to get back across the firewall onto our internal LAN.

I then thanked him for his time and passed the phone back to Greg Coomer. Greg asked him to send us a more detailed resume and told him that he would talk to Gabe early next week and get back to him. Greg also asked when he was available to fly over here so we could interview him in person. He said that he could come when we wanted him to as he could do any work he needed to do remotely.

At this point we hung the phone up. The time was approximately 11:40am.

The detailed information he provided to us fits with the information we discovered during our investigation of the break in. He provided us with details that we (Valve) have only revealed to the FBI (such as the names of the directories created on the machine and the use of the "vtun" and "adore" applications).


March 30, 2004 - "FW: So"

A forward of a miscellaneous email exchange where Axel sends Alfred his resume. The attached resume is below.

Attached:resume.rar (54 KB)

Here is Axel's resume.

-----Original Message-----
From: daguy@hush.com
Sent:Tuesday, March 30, 2004
To: Alfred Reynolds
Subject: RE: So

On Mon, 25 Mar 2004 Alfred Reynolds <alfred@valvesoftware.com> wrote:

HTML is fine. A microsoft word doc wouldn't hurt either.

Ok, here it is:
ftp:///ftp.uni-freiburg.de/incoming/resume.rar
password is "forvalve"


March 30, 2004 - "axel - resume.html"

Axel Gembe's resume. It seems to be somewhat tailored to Valve.

Axel Gembe

Objective: Network Administrator / Programmer

Summary

  • Experiences with administering and securing Linux, Windows, and BSD based networks
  • Experience in Visual C++, GNU C++, Pascal, BASIC, with focus on network, system and secure programming
  • Ability to develop custom security solutions, based on free IDS systems and self-written anomaly detection systems/firewalls
  • Ability to audit networks/software for common problems like buffer overflows, etc...
  • Teamwork with multiple security teams and/or version control using SVN, CVS, VSS and a little Perforce
  • Experience with cross-platform development on Win32/Linux and knowledge of the issues involved

Experience

Network Administration / Security:

  • Network Administrator at [REDACTED] since 5 years. During that time not a single security issue occurred, though numerous attempts were observed.
  • Server Administrator at PCom (German ISP) for 1 year, and for several other small companies.
  • Created an anomaly detection system and a firewall for securing those companies, based on iptables, tepdump and some self-written analysis software.
  • Contributed numerous fixes for the software I use to the Debian project, for example exim, debianutils, taper and vrum.
  • Experience with setting up 99% uptime services with full backup, UPS, backup servers and RAID disks.
  • Wrote various log parsing tools to diagnose fire detection systems. Implemented in a CGI that outputs a graphical representation of the data streams.
  • Experience with setting up secure VPNs using VTum or IPSec

Programming:

  • Wrote a remote administration toolkit that can be used to notify about unusual events automatically or just administering the server
  • Wrote a game engine that can display terrains based on the ROAM paper ( by Mark Duchineau, available here ), has its own windowing system, and can make use of 3DNow! processors. This is more of a test, cause I only got a test game for the engine.
  • Wrote exploits for various flaws like buffer overflows, integer overflows and more. Also I wrote various tools to automatically test software for these flaws.
  • Wrote a fast file synchronization algorithm using MD5 sums, which is also used in the SourceSafe client I wrote.
  • Ability to quickly learn new programming language

Relevant Work History

1999-pres. Network Administrator at [REDACTED] Germany
1997-1998 Server Administrator at PCom, Germany
1995-1998 Freelance webdesigner / programmer for all kinds of projects

Education

I don't really have any relevant education, in school I only learned really odd stuff, like how computers in the 80ies worked or Turbo Pascal

</div>


March 8, 2004 - "RE: So, do you believe me?"

In response to a threat by Axel, Gabe notes that the FTP server is already compromised, and offers Axel an all-expenses-paid interview. Also the only email in the chain to be from Gabe Newell.

Right now I'm assuming that our webserver and our FTP server are compromised. We're building new machines from scratch to replace them, and not getting too worried about what's on there until we swap them out.

The link, ftp://132.230.1.7/incoming/to_valve.rar, you sent doesn't appear to work (no files in the directory).

We pay for all interview related expenses (travel, hotel, food, etc...) as well as relocation expenses (pretty standard for the game business).

Gabe

-----Original Message-----
From:daguy@hush.com
Sent:Saturday, March 06, 2004
To:Gabe Newell
Subject:RE: So, do you believe me?

>I'll try to be more prompt in my replies.

May I ask what your definition of prompt is? :) If my intents weren't to clear this thing up, I could have already taken over your FTP server.

Also I'm sure I'm not the only one who got the 5.0.0.4 Serv-U exploit. I even modified it to work with enabled Win2k3 stack protection.

I understand that you had problems with Stream and that you are probably very busy, but you should really get someone to patch this hole, because it's only a matter of time until the exploit goes public, and Rhinosoft hasn't released a patch for this.

Maybe I should breakin and patch your FTP ? :)

Did you have a chance to look at my samples yet, and more importantly, are they still on the server ?

Well, I don't have time to write a longer email, cause I got a Peer 2 Peer network to test / get stable.


February 29, 2004 - "RE: So, do you believe me?"

Earlier on in the email chain, Axel alludes to his "insight into the hacking/cracking underground".

On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 Gabe Newell <gaben@valvesoftware.com>
wrote:
>Yep. I appreciated the heads up on that.

No problem, I can also inform you about possible security holes, cause I have quite a bit of insight into the hacking/cracking underground.

Well, what do you think about me working for you ? If you want the resume first, tell me. I would be happy if I didn't have to search for a job anymore.


February 28, 2004 - "RE: So, do you believe me?"

Axel Gembe reassures Gabe Newell that he interest in being hired is legitimate.

On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 Gabe Newell <gaben@valvesoftware.com>
wrote:
>Aagh. Crack week. We're going through planning for E3 and showing
>off
>the XBOX version for the first time. Microsoft is getting pretty
>hungry
>for anything to make the XBOX look competitive with the PS2.
>

No problem, I understand you are a busy man, especially when Bill wants his HL2 for his XBOX :) Does the XBOX even support Misc by default, or will you have to play it with controller?

>Were you kidding about working here? You certainly impressed us
>with
>your skills. We've hired a lot of people from the
community, and
>I
>guess in a funny way this would be more of the same. If you were
>teasing, ha ha, you got me.

No, I wasn't kidding, though the whole offer sounded strange :) But I trust your words. I am able to move, and I can start working any moment. I really want to work in a team as skilled as yours (and I would consider myself skilled, too, but where I live there are no good IT jobs, that's why I'm unemployed atm.).

I'll send you some kind of resume and a few samples of contrat and/or hobby work I've done (Don't judge me by the quality of the SourceSafe tool, I've written it in only 2 days, but it works well :).

So, in any case, when could I expect this to happen ? I might have to do to the army else, if I don't move out of the country, and having to go to the army sucks :) Well, I probably can't shake hands in office with you tomorrow, but I'l like to get this done ASAP is possible, because of the army issue :)

Also, you got some serious butt-kicking to do, so your admin upgrades ftp.valvesoftware.com like I told you last time, casue there are 2 public exploits against Serv-U 4.1, and there are also 2 unreleased private exploits which work up to 5.0.0.4 (I have a few connections, and write some exploits myself, too).

Also, may I officially pen-test your network the next few days if I'm bored ? I'll tell you all the info I found :) I did this for RWS once (with permission) and I gotta say they are pretty damn secure, but they don't host any big servers like you do for Steam.

Well, I really hope you hire me, I'm no bad guy, just a little misguided :)

>Gabe


February 19, 2004 - "RE: So, do you believe me?"

Axel alludes to who may have leaked the files, and pitches the job offer to Gabe for the first time.

On Thu, 19 Feb 2004 Gabe Newell <gaben@valvesoftware.com>
wrote:
>So how much do you know about the jerks who actually did the leak?

I can only say 1 name that I know of, which is SourceX. Hes the owner of LCIRC (which I didn't know before the leak), and he owns all the boxes LCIRC is hosted on. This breakin was clearly done using sniffed data from me and SourceX is the only one with the capabilities, the knowledge and the motives to have sniffed me there (I now even know of other people that got sniffed there, but I was stupid and trusted SSL to keep me secure).

Also I am sure I didn't exchange the passwords and other info elsewhere, and I personally know and trust the guy I've given them to. And seeing that most info points to SourceX and myg0t, it must have been them. I even think the Anon guy might have been from myg0t and/or known to myg0t.

>Was there some reason they were targetting you in particular?

I think so, I had access to valvesoftware.com, and they didn't have. Also I don't think this wa targeted by them, I just think they are bad guys and watch everything thats being done on their server, so they saw me exchanging that info with my co-worker, saw valvesoftware.com, checked it a little more and saw that it was complete login data and some misc other info. And I thought I'd have to hide from FBI and/or other agencies :)

>Gabe

Problem with this is that SourceX / whoever did this knows my real nick/ip and they will probably say "We didn't do this, his is the guy that did the breakin" or probably "that guy gave us access". And also there would have to be evidence. If you'd crack down on Hitman or some others of those for distributing the leak, he'd probably tell you the real people behind it, but I can only that it was done by myg0t. I might get you some more evidence, but that would require you to give me a written confirmation that you will not prosecute me for any hacking actions before may 2004 (you can exempt copyright violations/other stuff from this in case you don't trust me).

Also I'd like to ask, you don't happen to search a Programmer / Security specialist who recently lost his job ? I program small games, in OpenGL/D3D which work on Linux and Win32. I also code small utilities for my hacking / pentesting / network admin usage, and I'm pretty advanced when it comes to network security. Think about it, I'd really like to work for someone like you.

Also you didn't answer my last question, which was about what you would have done if I had told you that I was in you network early, like jan 2003.

In case you're too busy to answer my stuff, direct me to someone else (preferrably alfred, if hes got the time, he got knowledge of the stuff I installed on the linux pcs, and hes the one whose stuff I always admired the most, cause he does stuff for the linux community)

Please try to answer some of my questions, I try to answer yours, too.

- Da Guy


February 18, 2004 - "RE: So, do you believe me?"

Axel talks about how Valve should upgrade their security and about how he dot into the Valve servers in the first place.

On Tue, 17 Feb 2004 Gabe Newell <gaben@valvesoftware.com>
wrote:
>I get a couple of hundred spam messages a day, which sucks.

Ooh, that's bad :) I usually use addresses I dump later for most stuff, but I assume you can't do that as easily.

>I downloaded the VSS client, but I haven't had a chance to look
>at it
>yet. I need to run home to deliver chicken yakisoba to the starving
>children, but I'll take a look at it tonight.

yaki="fried" soba="buckwheat noodles" with chicken? Mmmmm, I like asian food, except sushi :) Thx for having a look at it, but don't if you're too busy, just throw it at someone else. I imagine you'd have to check the source for nasty backdoors, but be assured there are none. Anyways, I'd just like that tool to be used, cause I though its pretty kewl tool, but I have no use for it anymore cause I use cvs and/or BitKeeper for my programming work.

>So it's cool that you are clearing up the mystery for us, but why are
>you
>doing it?

Does knowing that you should have done this long time ago count? Also I wanted to know if you'd still want to catch me when you know that the real hacker didn't distribute HL2 but was getting sniffed. What would you have said if I told you of this in time ? Well, I also didn't like what the people releasing HL2 have done, so I want to disclose my part of the story. But I also gotta say that you people didn't do too much at that time for your network security (I think you were just too busy with HL2),

even after october, I had access to 4 Valve-owner systems, 1 being a team-server, 1 being the adminmod sf.net servers, 1 being your webserver (but someone kicked me out there and left messages on the FTP for me) and 1 being a MySQL server where I could have added malicious stuff into /root/.bash_history or into a .bat/.cmd file in startup folder).

So, my point here is: get a dedicated security person for the network, someone who only is there to administrate/audit networks. Also you should consider auditing the steam source sometimes, because that is critical infrastructure. In a network I administer we have all critical infrastructure stuff behind a second firewall that also runs an IDS, theres 1 internet facing host running Linux & WebServer, and it also runs a self written program that checks for anomalies in TCP traffic and blocks offending hosts at both firewalls. Also I want to note that I wrote me some kind of sourcecode encryption tool, that also is a build system, which will produce signed self-checking binaries using RSA private/public keys, maybe you could also think about using more secure build system.

What I'd also like to know is what was installed on your PC, cause I never even had access to it. When you wrote to hl2.net forums, you only mentioned a few of my tools, but the RemoteAnywhere and the keylogger were not installed by me. Basically I only did do the minimum required stuff, which was

crack
the PCS (I used the "Build" - "" Administrator account),
crack MD5 hashes using rainbow tables (took a few seconds to get most of em), g
get access to some good headless Win32 machine to use first (your compiler farm),
get angry about sourcesafe speed,
code my own tool,
get HL2 fast but not fast enough,
get access to some linux host (lists.valvesoftware.com, which was later cleaned, then I used Alfreds profiler host),
port my tool to Linux and finally get HL2 fast enough.

I've always used P4Win from a .cmd file, cause that was fast enough over Internet. After I accomplished this, I leaned back and watched your development process, which is the most amazing thing I ever saw.

Also I wanted to write you because lots of people claim they hacked you, like that Anon fag, but all this is based on a few passwords and some other info that was sniffed from me. I really shouldn't have transmitted that stuff in cleartext.

Well, write me if you wanna know anymore facts or other details, I think I can give you answers to much questions.

- Da Guy

PS: as much as I'd like to disclose my identity, I still fear getting caught for this, though I didn't want to harm anybody. Think about it, someone else could have entered your system as easily as me. But still I acknowledge that this was my fault & your fault, my fault for transmitting passwords in clear text and even entering those systems, your fault for not securing them properly.


February 16, 2004 - "Initial DaGuy email"

The initial email from DaGuy. It references a "e3 final.rtf" and an Invasion-era "objects.txt".

Hello Gabe,

I'm very sorry about what happened with HL2. I want to explain a few things. I was in your network for ~6 months, watching your development process, which was very interesting. Yes, I am the hacker, no, I didn't distribute HL2. Beginning of September, I was on LCIRC exchanging some info with a friend that works on a project with me, but my connection was being watched by the myg0t guys. I only found out later that LCIRC is full of myg0t people and I have been sniffed.

So, basically they got WebMail & VPN passwords by me being foolish about this stuff. I don't know exactly what they installed, but the modified RemoteAnywhere and the Keyloggers were not installed by me, I only installed a self-developed SourceSafe client/server system on 2 Win32 PCs to keep my HL2 up to date, and I later set up backdoors on 2 of the linux routers, and also ported my SourceSafe client-server system to Linux to be able to download faster. I think you found those, but the rest was not installed by me. If you got any interest in my VSS utility, mail me and I'll send the sourcecode, they give a huge speedup compared to VSS or SourceOffSite. Well, I learned from this incident that I should not transmit unencrypted passwords for such important things. I wanted to help you people get to know the truth by writing this mail, and I never intended to harm you. I only didn't tell you I was in your network cause I was afraid to get kicked out, I just wanted to observe the HL2 development process, cause I'm a hobby developer myself and a big an of HL2, let's just say I'm amazed by the capabilities of your team. Well, thats it. Just so there is no confusion about my identity, I'll just attach some document I got thats not available elsewhere cause myg0t probably only had time to check out very few stuff (~15 days).

tf2/scripts/objects.txt docs/e3_2003/e3 final.rtf

Thank you for your time,

- Da Guy

Though there are two more documents, they are simply duplicates of the two documents at the beginning.